

AUTOGRAPH TESTIMONY

P.W. Former Commander of the First Area Army
of the Kwantung Army. General KITA, Seichi.
From April 20 to April 23, 1946.

I, former Commander of the first Area Army of Kwantung Army, General KITA, Seichi shall state about the preparation for sei-ure of Manchuria and the attack against U.S.S.R. by Japan.

At the beginning of Showa era, i.e., in 1926, the civil war in China expanded. This civil war was caused by the anti-northern expedition carried out by Sun-Bun and CHIANG Kai-shek with the object of unifying and restoring the national rights of China. If this movement should extend to Manchuria, the Japanese rights in that area would be contradicted. The Japanese government, therefore, decided the following measures:

1. That the civil war of China shall not be allowed to extend over Manchuria.
2. That the influence of Sun-Bun shall not be allowed to penetrate into Manchuria.
3. That the government of CHANG Tsuo-lin in Manchuria shall be supported to the utmost so that he might be able to make every effort to prevent the Chinese national liberation movement from penetrating into Manchuria and also to suppress the anti-Japanese sentiment in Manchuria itself.

These political measures of Japan were decided by the Ministers of War, Navy and Foreign Affairs and were sanctioned by Premier TANAKA. I myself saw the documents concerning the above decisions at the War Ministry office in July, 1927. The then War Minister was General UGAKI.

In May 1928, the nationalist forces in North China smashed the resistance of CHANG Tsuo-lin and drove him into Manchuria. The nationalist movement did not penetrate into Manchuria, but the anti-Japanese sentiment there gradually aggravated. Under such conditions in China and Manchuria in August 1929, I was appointed assistant Military Attache to the Japanese Embassy in Nanking by the order of the Chief of the General Staff, General KANAYA, and was attached to Military Attache, Major-General SATO, who was stationed in Shanghai. I was appointed to this post, because I had studied the general situation in China, the characters and customs of the Chinese people, and the Chinese language, and also because I had some acquaintances among the important persons of the Army in the Nanking government. For instance, I met War Minister General HO Ying-Chin at CHENKIANG in 1927 through one of his friends who was working at the Japanese consulate in Nanking. At that time the Japanese War Ministry dispatched me for the investigation of the Nanking Incident in China. (Japanese residents took refuge in the Nanking Consulate, which was attacked by the nationalist force). I went to CHEN KIANG with the

object of spying upon the conditions of the nationalist anti-northern expedition. It was there that I made the acquaintance of HQ Ting-Chin, then the highest commander of the nationalist army in that section. HQ Ying-chin had formerly studied in the Military Academy of Japan and was kind to the Japanese. Besides this person, I was on good terms with the vice-chief of the Military Administration Section of the Nanking Government, CHEN-Yi, Inspector-General of Military Discipline, Lt. General CHU Ya-wei, Chief of the Survey Bureau of Army, Lt. General HUANG, MU-sung, and Commander of Engineer Corps, Lt. General YANG-Chieh. With them I was friends from the time when we were students of the Military Staff College in Tokyo. When I was appointed assistant Military Attache to the Embassy, my personal opinion regarding the Japanese policy in China was taken into consideration in addition to the above-said conditions. I, of course, was in accord with this policy. Before my departure for Nanking, I received the following instructions from the Chief of the General Staff, General KATAYA:

1. To spy upon the military strength of the Central Army of the Nanking Government.
2. To collect data regarding the national liberation movement originated by the Nationalist party, to pay special attention to the trend of expansion of this movement into Manchuria, and to make efforts to prevent it from penetrating into Manchuria.
3. To form friends among the military circles of the Nanking Government to facilitate execution of my duties.

I received the same instructions from the military attache to the Embassy, Major-General SATO in Shanghai, who directed me further on the day that I was dispatched to Nanking, to pay attention to the situation of military administration of the Nanking Government. After my arrival in Nanking, I established contact with the above-mentioned military authorities of the Nanking Government and I carried out my duties as instructed. Aside from the above, I took charge of the intelligence work pertaining to Military Administration. I executed this work through connections with important persons in the Nanking Government and by the utilization of secret agents. The situation in China at that time can be said to have facilitated intelligence work -- the segregation of society due to the civil war, the confrontation of the Chinese military cliques, the existence of anti-government elements and so on. We could easily fulfill whatever requirements concerning intelligence under such circumstances. I succeeded in forming somewhat better relationship with the military authorities of the Nanking Government, but the situation in Manchuria at that time was aggravated day by day by anti-Japanese movement which caused many incidents. Not long before the Manchurian Incident in 1931, a Japanese captain whose name was NAKAMURA was killed on a road in HSING AN LING near Solon. Captain NAKAMURA was one of the staff officers of the General Staff. The General Staff had dispatched him to attend to the intelligence work in the neighborhood of HSING AN LING. After my arrival as Chief of the second section of the Headquarters of Kwantung Army, in 1932, I heard from many people working at the headquarters of the Kwantung Army that the said NAKAMURA was dispatched with the object of investigating the roads in HSING AN LING and I am convinced of the statements being true.

I think I can safely say concerning the Japanese preparation for the occupation of Manchuria that the fact that Japan has long been covetous of Manchuria could be testified by the condition before the Manchurian Incident and by various other situations there. Japan wanted to have military bases in Manchuria for the execution of aggressive plans against Soviet Russia. The construction of strategic railway lines in Korea such as the Seoul-Fumen line, the Renan line, and the Fusan-Mukden line was carried out with the same objective. To realize this cherished plan some proper historical time had to be chosen. The year of 1931 afforded a good opportunity, because countries which had interests in Manchuria, for instance, China and Soviet Russia were absorbed in their own affairs and could not afford to direct their attentions to Manchuria, the former being absorbed in civil war, and the latter, in the five-year national construction program. Japan, taking all these facts into consideration, increased the expeditionary forces in Manchuria on Sept. 18 1931. The action resulted in the occupation of the whole of Manchuria. Following the occupation, Japan set to work on the establishment of Manchukuo. There were two opinions--one was to place Manchuria under Chinese administration with certain number of Japanese advisers in the Manchurian government, the other was to form an independent monarchical state, Manchukuo, and to keep the real power of the country in the hands of Japan. The latter plan was advocated by Lt. Col. ISHIMARA and Col. ITAGAKI who were at the headquarters of Kwantung Army, and was supported by Gen. ARAKI. In accordance with the latter program, all the ministers of the cabinet were selected from among the Manchurians, and the positions of vice-ministers were filled by Japanese subjects. Moreover, it was decided that some Japanese officials should serve in various Manchurian government offices. Such a policy aggravated the anti-Japanese sentiment among the Manchurian people, and caused the increase of anti-Japanese troops which had actively resisted the Japanese forces in Manchuria. In this connection Kwantung Army made it their primary task to annihilate all the anti-Japanese elements either by subjugating them or by advising their allegiance by means of propaganda. Major punitive expeditions were carried out around the cities of Harbin, Chinchow, and in the vicinity of TUNG PING TAO. The pursuit of the armies of MA Chen-shan and LI-Tu and the subjugation of Jehol were also punitive campaigns. These military operations were directed by the Chief of the Staff Lt. Gen. MIYAKE and Lt. Gen. KOISO when Generals Honjo and Muto were commanders of the Kwantung Army. These punitive operations caused the innocent Manchurian civilians enormous damage and brought many of them to bankruptcy. We cannot but definitely admit that such operations caused the dispersion of the people, destruction of houses, loss of properties and such like. Owing to the number of years that have elapsed I do not remember well the amount and scope of losses and damage caused by these operations, but I cannot but recognize the fact for seven long years warfare was conducted at a considerable sacrifice on the part of the Chinese people. During the period when I served at the headquarters of the headquarters of the Kwantung Army as Chief of the second section, the subjugation plans and measures were formed in the headquarters of the Kwantung Army by Col. SAITO and Lt. Col. HIRADO. Those officers who directly commanded the expeditions are as follows:

1. Harbin and the vicinity of KIRIN the 10th Division
(Commander, Lt. Gen. HIROSE)
2. The vicinity of Chinchow and Jehol the 8th Division
(Commander, Lt. Gen. NISHI).

3. The Province of HEILONGJIANG and the vicinity of QINHELENG the 14th Division (Commander, Lt. Gen. MATSURI, later succeeded by Lt. General HATA, Shinroku,
4. Vicinity of Jehol, the 6th Division (Commander, Lt. Gen. SAKAMOTO)
Mixed brigade (Commander, Maj. Gen. HATTORI)

A part of the above-mentioned divisions simultaneously launched a punitive campaign in another area. The operations in Jehol was directly commanded by the commander of Kwantung Army General MUTO and I also participated in the Jehol operations. I, as chief of the second section, presented to the chief of staff of Kwantung Army the data of intelligence concerning both the doings and movements of the anti-Japanese troops; and the districts whose population was imbued with anti-Japanese sentiments. Then the first section made the subjugation plan based on my reports. In the spring of 1934 a large scale military operation was carried out in the vicinity of TU LUNG SHAN, south of CHIA MU SSU. The operation was carried out to subjugate the Manchurian units which, being dissatisfied with the purchase of Manchurian possessed land by the Manchurian Development Company of Japan, revolted and attacked the Japanese forces with the result of annihilating the whole strength of a company and killing the regimental commander, Colonel IIZUKA. In order to suppress the rioters in the vicinity of TU LUNG SHAN, the Japanese army sent a large number of forces there. Bestirred by the retaliative sentiment provoked by the death of their own regimental Commander Col. IIZUKA, they caused enormous damages to the Manchurian residents. This fighting was directed by the chief of staff Col. KENO of the 10th Division (Commanded by Lt. Gen. HIROSE). The responsibility for these subjugation campaigns in general carried out by Kwantung Army in Manchuria during the period from 1931 to 1936 should be borne by the then commanders of Kwantung Army--Generals HONJO, MUTO, HISHIKARI, MINAMI and UEDA. At the same time in 1933 Japan began to take measures to expel from Manchuria the influence of Soviet Russia which at that time confined itself to the management of the Chinese Eastern Railway. With this object in view, the Japanese put various kinds of pressure upon the railway and its employees. These machinations were chiefly made by the head of military Special Service in Harbin, Maj. Gen. KOMI TSUBARA, the Representative of the South Manchuria Rly. Company in Harbin. Director USAMI and other agents, they were all under the direction of Col. HARADA, chief of the third section of headquarters. I cannot flatly deny the fact that Japan made use of agitators in the Chinese Eastern Rlys. in order to expel the influence of Soviet Russia from Manchuria or that Japan utilized some bandits to disturb the railway administration as well as to bring pressure to bear upon its employees. But at that time, not only the business of the Chinese Eastern Rlys, but also those of all other railways throughout Manchuria were disturbed by bandits.

In 1935 Japan, by resorting to every possible means, induced Soviet Russia to sell the right and interest of the Chinese Eastern Rlys. After that Japan gradually enlarged her preparation for military bases in Manchuria for war against Soviet Russia. Along with it, the building of fortresses in ten areas, the establishment of 200 airfields of all sizes,

the construction of railways extending 9,000 kilometers, the construction of Hsien-Hai Harbor, the construction of communications and roads, the establishment of munition factories etc., were carried out. Most of these construction works were executed in accordance with the plans prepared by the General Staff of the Japanese Government the Military Affairs Bureau of the War Ministry. The Kwantung Army took the following measures in order to carry out these plans, the instructions of the General Staff, and requests made by myself.

1. The fortification department to build fortresses.
2. The air force units to build air-fields.
3. The Manchurian Civil Engineering Bureau to build military roads.
4. The Manchurian Telegraph and Telephone Company to establish communications.
5. The construction of harbors and railways shall be entrusted to the South Manchuria Ry. Company.
6. The Manchurian Heavy Industry Company shall be founded for the establishment and management of munition factories.

The Japanese authorities, either purchased at low prices by compulsion the land owned by Manchurians or forced them to remove to other places for the sake of these construction works and for the settlement of Japanese immigrants, and thereby provoked intense dissatisfaction among the Manchurian people. In addition, the Japanese authorities established the system of compulsory labor to conscript Manchurians for military construction works. The conscripted laborers received lower wages than the free laborers to the detriment of their welfare. Moreover, the bad condition of housing, sanitation and supply, the defective management by the Japanese and so on resulted in the death of many laborers from sickness. In 1944, for instance, about 20,000 Manchurian laborers were employed for the construction of fortresses in the neighborhood of HSING AN LING and the number of those who died from illness mounted to 500. The former chiefs of staff of the Kwantung Army, Lt. Gen. HATA and General USHIROKU explained to me that there were cases of death reported from other districts but they did not tell me the number of the dead laborers. The total number of Manchurian laborers conscripted by Kwantung Army amounted to 120,000 or 130,000.

Those who were responsible for the strengthening of Manchuria as military bases against Soviet Russia since the Manchurian Incident in 1931 are Japanese Premier, INUKAI, KONOE, and General TOJO; Japanese War Ministers Generals ARAKI, SUGIYAMA and TOJO; Chiefs of the General staff, Generals KAWAYA, Prince KAN-IN, SUGIYAMA and TOJO; Commanders of the Kwantung Army, Generals HONJO, HISHIKARI, MINAMI, UEDA and UMEZU, and those members of the headquarters of the Kwantung Army to whom I referred to in this testimony. In August of 1934 I was transferred to the position of Chief of the China section the General Staff. The then chief of the General Staff was Prince KAN-IN, Deputy Chief, Lt. Gen. SUGIYAMA (later General); Chief of the 1st department, Maj. Gen. SUZUKI (later Lt. Gen.); chief of the 2nd Department, Maj. Gen. ISOYA (later Lt. Gen.), and chief of the 3rd department, Maj. Gen. USHIRO-KU (later General). The work of the China section was the adjustment and judgment of the intelligence pertaining to China and the investigation of topography for military purposes. The section constituted of two groups, that is, the China group (chief, Lt. Col. KUSUMOTO) and the geography group (chief Lt. Col. WACHI), with four or five officers being attached to each of them. The work was executed

by studying and putting together all the intelligence and documents from the Korea Army, Kwantung Army, Tientsin Army and Formosa Army; from the military attaches and officers stationed in the various countries, especially from the attache at the Embassy in China and officers stationed in Peking, Peking, and Canton, together with those from the Navy and Foreign Ministry. While I was in that post, the anti-Japanese sentiment in China gradually increased and spread owing to the Manchurian Incident, but nothing serious happened. At that time a plan for strengthening the forces in Manchuria was furthered and in 1936 the program to increase Kwantung Army to four divisions, five railway guard units (each five battalions) and four frontier garrisons, was realized.

In 1934 the General Staff gave Kwantung Army instructions pertaining to the building of fortresses. In this connection investigation had already been made since about 1933.

The Anti-Comintern Pact among Japan, Germany, and Italy:

In 1936 the anti-Comintern Pact was concluded among Japan, Germany and Italy. Negotiations relative to this pact had already been in progress since autumn 1935 between the military attache to the Embassy in Germany, Lt. Gen. OSHIMA, and the German government authorities. Since then through the efforts of Military Attache OSHIMA its conclusion was reached. It is not clear who, among the important governmental officials in Tokyo supported this measure, but I, as well as other persons clearly recognized the fact that the appearance of this pact, whose nature was provocative to Soviet Russia, brought an ill effect on the diplomatic relations between the two countries. In Japan this anti-Comintern Pact was used to unify the National thought against Soviet Russia. Every possible effort was made to instigate the people that we had to fight to the utmost against the Communist politics of Soviet Russia, and that it was necessary to dissolve the PA LU Army of China, etc. This pact resulted in strengthening Japanese national spiritual preparation for war against Soviet Russia and also in the interference in the internal administration of China.

The days when I was the Military Attache to the Embassy in China:

In April 1936, having been appointed the Military Attache to the Embassy in China, I reported to Shanghai. Before this, the Foreign Minister of the Tokyo Government, considering the fact that the Sino-Japanese relation was becoming more serious, had newly appointed Ambassador KAWAGOE to China. The problems to be solved by the Ambassador were as follows:

1. China shall connive the Japanese rights in Manchuria, that is to say, China shall pretend not to notice the occupation of Manchuria by Japan.
2. China shall suppress movements which are anti-Japanese and which are insulting to Japanese. Both countries shall cooperate economically.

3. China shall cooperate with Japan in anti-Comintern activities.

I remember that as the compensation for the above three conditions Japan promised China economic and technical aid. Although in June 1936, Ambassador KAWAGOE began negotiations with the Nanking Government on these problems, the Nanking Government did not agree and the negotiations were suspended. The Nanking Government made the following answers as to the proposals offered by Japan:

1. China will not officially recognize Manchukuo, but will connive the situation in Manchuria.
2. China herself will resist Communism. Materially speaking, China is fighting against the Pa Lu Army. But she cannot promise Japan that she will cooperate against Communism lest it should aggravate diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia.
3. The Chinese Government cannot suppress the anti-Japanese movements in China by its own power as it represents the sentiment of the whole Chinese people, and not sentiment of an individual.

The Nanking Government continued to maintain this opinion till the last moment, and brought about the Sino-Japanese war in 1937. Before my departure for Shanghai as Military Attache to the Embassy in China, I received from the Deputy Chief of the Staff, Lt. Gen. NISHIO instructions, the important points of which were as follows: "I shall collect intelligence regarding the political trend of the Nanking Government, especially the military situation and at the same time co-operate with Ambassador KAWAGOE to adjust the diplomatic relations between both countries." I went from time to time to Nanking and saw the Ambassador. However, relations with China became serious day by day and at last an incident broke out when, in July 1937, Japanese troops stationed in the suburbs of Peking on maneuver were fired upon by the Chinese. Japan strived to solve the problem on the spot but did not succeed. Japan later announced in the press and to the diplomatic representatives that she would not recognize CHUNG Kai-shek's Government and would attack to punish the Chinese troops. In August 1937 the Japanese landing party (Navy) collided with the Chinese forces near Shanghai. This incident formed the second stage of the gradually expanding Sino-Japanese War.

The period when I was the Chief of the Special Service Section and the Chief of the Liaison Section of the China Affairs Board (KO-A-In).

In August 1937 at the time of the expansion of the Sino-Japanese War the North China Area Army was established in Peking. At the same time, I was appointed Chief of the Special Service Section of the Army and reported to my new post in Peking. I was appointed to that post by War Minister Gen. SUGIYAMA. The duties of the Special Service Section

were to execute the work of Military Administration, and the actual work was to Japanize the occupied areas in China, i.e. to establish a government as a guiding organ of politics, economics and culture. I made the following bureaux in the Special Service Section.

1. General Affairs Bureau--in charge of political matters.
2. First Economic Bureau--in charge of finance and economy.
3. Second Economic Bureau--in charge of traffic and industries.
4. Culture Bureau--in charge of education and culture.

Experts were sent to the Special Service Section from various departments of the Japanese government and in order to establish a plan for managing administration and economy in the occupied areas in China at that time. An important measure, which I took in North China while I was chief of the Special Service Section, was the establishment of a regime in North China with Wang Ko-min, a pro-Japanese at its head. He was formerly a finance minister, but I do not remember in what regime. Japanese representatives were employed as advisers in the Wang Ko-min regime. As one of the advisers I took direct charge of political affairs. The others were economic adviser HIRAO Hachisaburo, administrative adviser YUSAWA Michio, and legal adviser ODATE Shigeo. These three were not military men. The principle of the advisers was to carry out the policies of the Japanese government in the activities and operations of the Wang Ko-min regime and to cooperate to the fullest extent with Japanese Military forces in the war against China. In 1939 the Special Service Section was DISSOLVED and its duties were transferred to the newly organized Asia Development Board (Koain). I was appointed Chief of the North China Liaison Section of the Asia Development Board. I received this appointment from the cabinet, HIRANUMA was Premier at that time. Since the board was not a military organ, I became a civilian official, but still remaining in active service. I was also a committeeman on the board. The headquarters of the Asiatic Development Board was in Tokyo and Premier HIRANUMA was the head and the president. Vice-presidents were War Minister Lt. General ITAGAKI, THE Navy Minister, the Foreign Affairs Minister and the Finance Minister; and there were about sixty board members. The actual work was not carried out by the president but by Chief of the General Affairs Bureau YANAGAWA Heisuke. Since this board was not a social organization but a purely national organization, civilian officials as well as military officers could become board members. As stated above during the time when I was Chief of the Liaison Section up until 1940 the planning duty of the Asia Development Board was to Japanize China. I know well that such a plan was not to be applied to the other countries which came into the system of greater East Asia. Later, however, upon the break of the Jap.-U. S. war when Japan occupied other countries in East Asia such as Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, the Phillipine Islands and other islands in the Southern Pacific, the scope of such activities as those of the Asia Development Board was greatly expanded. Therefore, so as to perform the planning duties of the board not only in China but also in the occupied territories in Greater East Asia, a larger and stronger organization based on the Asian Development Board was required. Consequently, in the beginning of 1942, the Board was absorbed by the newly established Greater East Asia Ministry and the duty of the Chief of the

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Liaison Section of the Board was transferred to the embassies set up in the various occupied territories. For example there was General YAMADA, the commander of the Kwantung Army as Envoy Extra-ordinary and Ambassador Plenipotentiary in Manchuria, TANI as Ambassador in a similar position in the Wang Ching-Wei regime and similar embassies in Burma, Thailand, French Indo-China, other countries occupied by Japan. These embassies performed the planning duty of the former Asia Development Board, that is, they Japanized the territories under Japanese occupation. While I was the Chief of the Special Service Section and the Liaison Section in North China, I did much to assure the suitable condition of the strategic operation of our North China Army and to help to strengthen the military foundation in Manchuria.

In the summer of 1937, the Inner Mongolian Garrison Army was set up in Kalgan concurrently with the operations of the North China Army. In August 1937, the Kwantung Army under the command of the Chief of Staff Lt. General TOJO (later full general) captured Inner Mongolia and established the Special Service Agency TOKUMU-KIKAN, appointing Major General MATSUI its chief. Later, when the Mongolian Army was established its Commander was Lt. General HASUNUMA, the Special Service Agency was changed into the Special Service Section (TOKUMU-BU and Major General MATSUI remaining as chief. In November 1937, Major General MATSUI established a Japanized Mongolia-Hsinking government headed by Prince Te. Japanese advisors from Manchuria were placed in this government. The object of our occupation of Inner Mongolia and the establishment of a Japanized government was the same as our object at the time when we got possession of Manchuria, that is to say, to hold Inner Mongolia at Japan's command and set up a military base there against Outer Mongolia. This measure was carried out at the insistence of Lt. General TOJO, the then Chief of Staff of the Kwantung Army, and the same policy was continued by him even after he became Prime Minister of Japan. The assistance which I offered to the measure for the taking of Inner Mongolia was in creating in North China a provision for driving out of China and out of Inner Mongolia the Chinese forces which opposed our North China Army thereby facilitating Lt. General TOJO's occupation of Mongolia. The Japanese assets in Inner Mongolia being lacking, Japan did not build fortresses there as she did in Manchuria but maintained a force of 50,000 soldiers in Inner Mongolia until 1941. As to the border line troubles at Chang-Ku-Feng in 1938 and at Nomonhan in 1939, the hostilities between Japan and the Soviet Russia initiated by Lawless actions of the Japanese Army; and since the details and the persons responsible for those incidents are well known, I need not make any further answer here.

In March 1940, I was recalled from the position of Chief of the Liaison Section of the Asiatic Development Board and appointed commander of the 14th Division in Utsunomiya (Japan). In September 1940, I was told confidentially by the Chief of the General Staff His Highness Prince Kan-in that the 14th Division would be diverted to Manchuria in accordance with a plan to increase the Kwantung Army to 15 divisions. In October 1940, I arrived at Chichihaerh with my division. Since such an increase in strength was not necessary for defense of order in Manchuria it was in preparation for Japanese operations against the Soviet Russia.

When I was in Chichihaerh with the division in 1940, I received secret instructions from the commander of the 6th Army to the effect that the officers of the 14th Division were requested to be thoroughly familiar with the topography in the vicinity of Hairaerh, as the division would be employed on the Hairaerh plain in case of the outbreak of war; and also that training should be carried out so as to be chiefly capable of sustained defense against the well-equipped Russian forces. Moreover, the 6th Army in Hairaerh executed map strategic maneuvers in the vicinity of Hairaerh twice in 1940, by way of studying the operation against Soviet Russia. I and my staff participated in these and I stressing combat with Soviet Russia trained my subordinates.

After the outbreak of war between Germany and Russia in 1941, the General Staff Headquarters heavily increased the Kwantung Army by sending troops, horses and guns from Japan in order to strengthen the preparation for the operations against Russia. This increase was executed in accordance with a plan known as "Ken-Toku-En" (Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers). The amount of troops and ordnance of the Kwantung Army reached the maximum limit under the plan of the summer of 1941. First of all, two fresh divisions were sent from Japan and added to the thirteen divisions already there. Besides this, each division was increased by 5,000 personnel and 3,500 horses. Consequently, the Kwantung Army which, before the "Ken-Toku-En" consisted of:

13 divisions.....	195,000 men
2 tank divisions.....	30,000 men & 400 tanks
Air forces.....	24,000 men & 1,000 planes
Border guards (28 battalions).....	19,000 men
Railway guards (5 units).....	17,500 men
Rear forces.....	100,000 men
Total...(men).....	386,00
(horses).....	40,000

It now possessed 600,000 men and 80,000 horses due to the increase made by the "Ken-Toku-En" plan. As for guns, the 14th Division under my command had the increased number of 48 while the number previously was 36. It may be considered that similar increases were made in other divisions.

When the increase was put into effect, the Imperial Headquarters issued an order to hasten preparations for the operations against Soviet Russia. This order was issued in the latter part of June 1941, but I did not read it, and I do not know its number, as I simply heard of it from a man in the service of the Kwantung Army. At that time I received no other order except an instruction from the Commander of the 6th Army to which my 14th Division belonged. However, the Commander of the 6th Army ordered the 23rd Division at Hairaerh to build field fortifications on the heights east of Hairaerh in order to quickly prepare for the operation. All the conditions in Kwantung Army during the summer of 1941 were of such a nature as to hasten preparations for a war against Russia. But, at that time, the Japanese forces had invaded and occupied French Indo-China. This caused a sudden tension in the Jap-American relations, making the situation acute and, as a consequence, Japan was placed at a crossroad. That is to

say, the Japanese Government did not know whether she should open a war first against the Soviet Russia or against America. The following three items were decided at an Imperial Council in Tokyo in June 1941:

- (1) To go on independently with no opinions and policies of our own as regards the Russo-German War.
- (2) To prepare for the operations in the South.
- (3) To keep peace with Russia on the borders.

But at this time, too, Japan suddenly irritated Russia by continuing the reinforcements of Kwantung Army based on the "Kan-Toku-En" plan. I was appointed to the Commander of the 6th Army in October 1941, and soon after that I was called to the Kwantung Army Headquarters together with other commanders. At that time, the commander of the Kwantung Army General LIMEZU gave individually to each army commander instructions as regards the duties of the war-time armies. I received the following instructions for the 6th Army: At the outbreak of war the 6th Army should firmly hold the positions in Hailaerh and its adjacent key-points, and plan for sustained defence. One division shall be added to the 6th Army after one month. General LIMEZU however, did not indicate to me the duration of time for the sustained defense and the time for opening the war. I was only instructed to maintain the positions in Hailaerh for a long period of time.

In accordance with the duty given me, I reinforced the fortifications already built by the 23rd Division on the heights east of Hailaerh and strengthened the operational preparations; and at the same time stored enough ammunition and food supplies for six months near Hailaerh. In June 1942 at Chichihaerh, when the Second Area Army, to which the 6th Army belonged, was set up, its Commander Lt. General ANAMI Korechika explained to me the object of establishing the Second Area Army and its present duty as well as the present and future duties of the 6th Army under my command. In this explanation I was informed of the preparations for attacking Soviet Russia, which had been underway in the Kwantung Army in accordance with the strategic plan known by the secret name as plan "B" (Otsu), which was decided at General Staff Headquarters. Troops, horses, guns and ammunition were sent to the Kwantung Army from Japan and China according to the "Kan-Toku-En" plan, which was preparation for a part of the general strategic plan known as "No. B". Lt. General ANAMI further indicated to me that, since the 6th Army was going to assume the offense at the third stage of the operations, I should make necessary investigation and preparation for it. He further explained the strategic plan which should be followed by main force of the Second Area Army at the second stage. The details will be given later. The offensive movement at the first stage in the area of Maritime Province was to be carried out by the First Area Army according to the Strategic Plan "B". I was told about the plan of the First Area Army for the offensive operation by the former Commander of the First Area Army General YAMASHITA at Tokyo in October 1944 when his duties were transferred to me. This same operation was explained to me in more detail by the Chief of Staff Lt. General SHIDEI when I took over my duties as Commander of the First Area Army, in Mutanchiang.

Thus I was fully informed of the progress of the preparations and offensive operation of the First and Second Area Armies of the Kwantung Army based on Plan "B". Under this plan the following measures were to be taken.

Preparatory Measures

Heihe District:- In the peace time there were in this district two divisions of the Fourth Army and one detachment of borderguards. The Army Headquarters was at Sunwu. Before the war was opened against Soviet Russia the Second Area Army and N Army were to be set up at Tsitsihar and Heike respectively. N Army seemed to be changed to 8th Army later. This formation was to be made by diverting four divisions from China and Japan. Consequently the Second Area Army was to have attained a strength of six divisions before the outbreak of war, that is. There were three divisions of the 4th Army at Sunwu, two divisions of 8th Army at Heike and one division under the direct control of the Area Army. Besides, the 6th Army under the Second Area Army consisting of the 23d Division and the Arshan detachment (about one division strong) should be increased by the addition of another division after the outbreak of war. Two more divisions were to be added in the future.

Maritime Province District:- Those stationed in peace time in this district were three divisions of the 5th Army, three divisions of the 3rd Army, the 71st Division at Hunchung and one division under the direct control of the Kwantung Army at Chiamusu--eight divisions in all together with two tank divisions. In 1941, 20th Army Headquarters was established at Tsining and to that army was given one division each from the 3rd, and 5th Armies. Prior to the outbreak of war, the 1st Area Army Headquarters, and the 2nd Army Headquarters were to be set up at Mutanchiang and Chientao respectively according to Plan B. Eight more divisions were to be transferred to this district from Japan and China, making the First Area Army possess fifteen divisions and two tank divisions, that is, three divisions and one tank division of the 5th Army, five divisions and one tank division of the 20th Army, three divisions of the 3rd Army, two divisions of the 2nd Army and two divisions under the direct control of the First Area Army. In addition there was one air force army under the direct control of the Kwantung Army Commander with 1,000 planes. The Kwantung Army was expected to be in the above condition on the Eastern, Northern and Western fronts just before the opening of war against the USSR according to the Plan "B".

Offensive Plan:- In accordance with the offensive Plan "B" we expected to seize the entire Far East as far as Baikal in four successive steps. In the first step the 4th and the N Armies of the Second Area Army were to carry out demonstrations on the Russian border near Sunwu and Heike, pretending offensive preparations by occasionally shooting into Russian territory. No actual offensive, however, was to be made. Thus the Red Army was expected to be fettered within that area. Should the Red Army start an offensive it must be checked. The 6th Army should maintain its positions at Hailor and Arhshan.

In case an attack was made by the Red Army from Chita via Manchuria it must be checked by keeping these positions firm. In this case, the 1st Area Army in the Maritime Province District would act decisively on the offensive according to the following plan:-

(a) The 5th Army shall advance from Kuling with 3 divisions and 1 tank division and occupy Duan, and, while securing Duan to the North with a portion of its force, the main force shall march southward to join the battle to be fought by the main force of the First Area Army near Voroshilov.

(b) Two divisions of the 2nd Army shall advance from Hunchung break through the border; proceed North through the Nann District toward Voroshilov. Its action shall be in concert with the main force of the Area Army.

(c) Five divisions and one tank division of the 20th Army shall go south toward Voroshilov, passing the south-west side of Lake Hsingkoi.

(d) Three divisions of the 3rd Army shall advance from Tunkming to ~~neerukovo~~ and join the area army's main force there. All these forces were to press the Red Army at Voroshilov, and part of them, after seizing Voroshilov, were to cooperate with the Japanese Navy at Yuanshan to capture Vladivostok by envelopment. This was to end the first stage. Its chief object was to secure Japan proper and the industrial areas of Manchuria from the Red Army's air raids from the Maritime Province district, by entirely occupying the district.

Second Stage:- In case the first stage of the offensive was successful, the main force of the First Area Army was to advance Northward toward Habarovska along the railroad, leaving part of the Army in the Maritime Province to maintain the occupied area. The division stationed at Chiamusu would occupy the positions facing Leninsk to protect the wings of the First and Second Armies in the vicinity. At this time the 4th and the 5th Armies of the Second Area Army would cooperate with the First Area Army and commence an offensive operation from Heike and its vicinity; cross the Amur; seize Blagoveshchensk Kuibishevka and Svobodny and cut off the Siberian Railway. One part of the forces were to defend the West and the main force was to move eastward along the railway line to Khabarovsk. Then the First and the Second Area Armies were to cooperate in attacking in a decisive battle the Red Army from both sides and occupy Khabarovsk. This was to complete the second stage.

Third Stage:- After the occupation of Khabarovsk the Second Area Army would immediately turn westward to make preparations for the reinforcements necessary for the future offensive operations upon the Zabaikalyo. At this time the 6th Army at Hailar was to be reinforced raising its strength to four divisions which were to prepare to advance the attack. In the Maritime Province the First Area Army was to secure the important districts and the rear of the Second Area Army. The main force of the Second Area Army would turn West after completing preparations and commence the advance to Chita along the railway.

As soon as the Second Area Army's main force reached Mogacha, the 6th Army was immediately to start the attack by breaking through the border near Sanho and Manchuria. And the 6th Army was to act in cooperation with the Second Area Army's main force and advance to Chita and its southern area. On seizing Chita and its vicinity, the Second Area Army was to secure important districts in the West; and thus the operation of the third stage was to come to a close.

In the fourth stage it was planned to continue the offensive until the Zabarkalye as far as Lake Baikal was seized. But I do not know about the offensive plan of the fourth stage.

Operations Regarding Outer Mongolia: - In the third stage, at the same time as the commencement of the advance of the 6th Army, the Arhshan Detachment (approximately one division) was to have been brought under the direct control of the Second Area Army to combine with and take command of the Mongolian force in Manchuria (approximately one division) and advance to Chita from Arhshan via Tampsakbulak, Baintumen and Ulan-Orasomon. This unit would cover the right wing of the Second Area Army by marching through the eastern part of Outer Mongolia.

Maintaining coordination of all Military Operations the Imperial Headquarters was to transfer one mechanized army group from North China and to have it begin strategic operations from Kalgan toward Ulan-Bator. But I am not able to explain the plan for the future development of the offensive action since I don't know it. The general outline of the offensive plan against Soviet Russia is as above. This plan for the offensive operation against the Soviet Union in 1942 was set up by the General Staff and the Kwantung Army; it was revised every year thereafter. This plan for Japanese military measures existed till around the middle of 1944. Since Japan faced difficult conditions in the battle field of Greater East Asia War, she could not carry out this plan. This hand-written testimony is confirmed by my signature.

General Kita Seiichi
Ex-Commander of the First Area Army
Kwantung Army

Interrogator: Lt. Colonel Derevyankin

Interpreter: Shehebenkov

C E R T I F I C A T E

I, Lt. Colonel TARANENKO G. I.

a member of the military forces of the U.S.S.R., do hereby certify
that 22 pages of a photostat of the testimony of the Japanese
prisoner of war general Kita Seiichi, written by him in Japanese on
April 20-23

was delivered to me by the Prosecutor of the Khabarovsk Region of the
U.S.S.R.

on or about June 27, 1946, and that the original of the said
document may be found in the files of the Prosecutor's Office of the
Khabarovsk Region.

I do further certify _____.

Lt. Col. TARANENKO
(Signature and rank.)

Tokyo, Japan

September 26 , 1946.

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Ex 835

No. 1

自筆証言

俘虜前関東軍第一方面軍司令官大將

喜多誠一

自 四月二十日

至 四月二十三日 一九四六年

私前関東軍第一方面軍司令官喜多誠一大將、日本、滿洲獲得準備及討滅政勢ニツキ陳述ス。昭和初頭一九二六年支那ニ於テ内乱擴大ス此内乱、孫文及蔣介石軍、北伐ニヨリ起リタルモノニテ支那之民ノ統一及支那之權回收ノ目的ヲ以テ行ハルタルモノナリ。此運動滿洲ニ波及スル時、是ハ日本ノ權利ニ撞着スルヲ以テ日本政府ハ次ノ政治方針ヲ決定セリ。

1. 滿洲支那ノ内乱ヲ進入セシメス
2. 孫文勢力ノ滿洲滲透ヲ防止ス
3. 滿洲ニ於ケル張作霖ノ政權ヲ極力支持シ彼ノ基礎キ支那ノ民自由運動ヲ滿洲ニ進入セサル様努力シ又滿洲自体ニ於ケル排日員有ヲ制圧スルヲ要セリ

此日本ノ政治方針ハ陸海大臣外務大臣ト共ニ策定シ田中總理大臣之ヲ決裁セリ。自今ハ一九二七年陸軍省ニ於テ此決定ニ關スル書類ヲ見タリ。當時陸軍大臣ハ宇垣大將ナリ。

FILE COPY
RETURN TO ROOM 361

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一九三八年五月北支ニ於ケル国民党軍ハ張作霖
ノ抵抗ヲ抑圧シ滿洲ニ駆逐セリ国民党ノ運動
ハ滿洲ニ進入セザリモ滿洲ニ於ケル抗日気分ハ
逐次激化セリ斯カル支那及滿洲ノ情況ノ下ニ
於テ一九三九年八月參謀總長金谷大將ノ命ヨ
リ南京大使館附武官輔佐官ニ任セラレ上海ニ駐
在セル大使館附武官佐藤少將ニ附属スルコトトナ
レリ。私ハ支那ノ情況支那ノ國民性風俗及支那語
ヲヨク研究シ又南京政府ニ於ケル軍政要人中ニ知
人ヲ有セリ以テ此職ニ任セラレタルモノナリ例ハ軍
政部長何應欽大將ハ一九二七年南京日本領事
館ニ勤務セル彼ノ友人ニヨリ鎮江ニ於テ會見セリ
當時日本陸軍省ハ支那ニ於ケル南京事件（日本居
留民ハ南京領事館ニ避難シ國民黨軍ハスラ襲
撃セル）ノ狀態ヲ調査ノ爲私ヲ派遣セリ其時
私ハ國民黨軍ノ北伐ノ情況ヲ諜知スル目的ヲ以
テ鎮江ニ赴ケリ茲ニ此方面ニ於ケル國民黨軍ノ最
高指揮官タル何應欽ト知人トナレリ。何應欽ハ

No. 2.

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前二日本工官學校ニ留学三日本人ニ討ニ親切ナリキ
是レ以外ニ私ハ南京政府軍政部次長陳儀訓練總監
周亞衛中將軍測量局長黃慕松中將工兵司令楊
木中將ト能ク友好關係ニ在リ私ハ上記ノ支那將軍ト
東京陸大ニ共ニ在學セリ且初ヨリ彼等ト友人ナリ私ヲ大
使館附武官輔佐官ニ任命セル時ハ上記ノ條件ノ外交部
ニ於ケル日本政策ニ討ニ自分ノ意見ヲ考慮セリ私ハ勿論
此政策ニ討ニ賛成者ナリ南京政府創ニ私ハ參謀總長
金谷大將ヨリ次ノ訓令ヲ受ク

1. 南京 政府中軍部武力ヲ諒知ス
2. 國民黨ヨリ起ル國民自由運動ニツキ資料ヲ蒐集
ニ將ニ滿洲ニ在ル此運動ノ振大ノ傾向ニ注意ス之ヲ
滿洲ニ波及セシメル如ク努力ス
3. 業務遂行ヲ容易ナラシムル爲南京政府ノ軍人界ト
連絡友好關係ヲ結フニ是等ノ訓令ハ上海大使
附武官佐藤少將ヨリ同様ニ受ケ此外私ハ南京ニ派
遣ノ時南京政府ノ軍事政治ノ狀態ニ注意スニト
指示セリ私ハ南京到着後上記ノ南京政府ノ軍部
局長者ト連絡ヲ遂ケ又受ケタル訓令ニ基キ自己ノ業
務ヲ履行セリ是レ以外ニ又軍事政治ノ諜報ヲ担任
セリ此任務ハ南京政府ノ要人ト連絡又諜報ヲ利
用ヨリ遂行セリ當時ノ支那ノ情況ハ諜報勤務
ノ爲容易ナリト云フ得(ニ即チ支那ニ於テハ社
會内亂ニ依リテ分立ニ支那軍閥ノ分立又政府

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110.

反對、分子等アリテ吾々、如何ナル謀報上、要求ヲモ達成
ス可ク得タル而シテ上記ノ條件、下ニ南京政府軍務局長、
關係ハ若シ良好トナルニ成功シタルモ當時滿洲ニ於ケル
情況ハ概目運動愈々擴大シ總ニ生事件ヲ惹起セリ
一九三三年滿洲事變ノ稍々前興安嶺、或ル一道路
索倫附近ニ於テ日本中村大尉ヲ殺害セリトシ、中村
大尉ハ參謀本部參謀ナリ參謀本部ハ彼ヲ興安
嶺附近謀報ノ任務ヲ以テ派遣セリ中村大尉ハ興安
嶺ノ道路調查目的ヲ以テ派遣セルコトニ付私ハ一九三三年
關東軍司令部オニ課長トシテ着任後關東軍司令
部ノ勤務者多數ヨリ聞知セリ又是ハ實際ナリトテ自
分モ確信ニアリ日本、滿洲ヲ獲得スルノ準備ニ関シテ
ハ私ハ、如何云フ得ヘシ日本ハ從來ヨリ滿洲ニ對シ
希望ヲ有セシ滿洲事變前、狀態其他種々ノ事態
ニヨリ證明セラル日本ハ自己、對蘇攻勢計畫遂行爲
滿洲ニ於ケル軍事地盤ヲ保有スルヲ欲セリ朝鮮ニ於
ケル鐵路鐵道建設例ハ京城、圖們、綏芬河、羅津
、羅南線又釜山、奉天線ノ建設ハ亦之迄モ無ク一ツ目
的ヲ追フモノナリ此問題ヲ解決スル爲ニ適當ナル歴史的
時間ヲ選ハサルハカラス斯クシテ一九三二年ハ恰度適時ナ
リ即チ滿洲ニ對シ關係アル他全例ハ支那ノ内亂ニ意
カシ蘇聯モ五年計畫ニヨツテ國內建設ニ意カシアリ
ナリ是等ヲ考慮シ日本ハ一九三二年九月十八日滿洲出征
ヲ概々全滿ヲ獲得スルノ結果トナシ

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滿洲獲得ニ從ヒ日本ハ滿洲ヲ組織ニ着手セリニツキ
見アリカニ滿洲ノ支那ノ政權ノ下ニ置キ滿洲政權ニ若
干日本顧問ヲ入ルルニ然ラシメ關東軍司令官ニ勤務スル
石原中佐板垣大佐ノ主張ニヨリ荒木大將ノ父ヲ支持シ帝
政滿洲獨立ヲ樹立シ其實權ヲ日本ニ於テ把握スル様
組織セリ之ヲ爲メ各大臣ヲ滿人トシ次長ハ日人ヲ任命シ又
官衙内ニ日人官吏ヲ入ルルコトヲ決定セリ斯カル政策ハ又
一層ニ滿人中ニ抗日運動ノ氣分ヲ鋭クセリ是ハ滿洲ニ於
テ日本軍ニ對シ抗日ニ活動スル反抗軍ノ擴大ノ原因ニ
爲セリ關東軍ハ是ニ對シ滿洲ニ於テ抗日分子ヲ討
伐ニヨリ掃蕩シ他方ニ於テ宣傳ニヨリ彼等ニ歸順ヲ勸
ムコトヲ力ニ任務トセリ是等ノ主ナル討伐ハ哈爾濱錦州
東遼道附近ニ行ハレ又馬占山及李杜軍ノ追撃被テ討伐
等ナリ是等ノ討伐ハ關東軍司令官本庄大將武勝大將
ノ時參謀長三宅中將小磯中將ニヨリ行ハレタリ是等
討伐作戰ハ無事ノ滿人住民ニ大ナル損害破産ヲ與ヘタリ
即チ討伐ハ住民ノ離散住家ノ燒却財産ノ喪失等ヲ伴フ
コトヲ明カニ認メサルカラス私ハ長年月ヲ経過セル身
討伐ニヨリ住民ニ與ヘタル犠牲ノ數量ト範圍ヲ記憶セザル
然レ七年前ノ戰爭ニヨリ大ナル犠牲ヲ與ヘタルコトヲ認メサ
レカラス私ハ力ニ課長トシ關東軍司令官ニ在職
間是等討伐ノ數量及計劃ハ關東軍司令部ニ於テ
有藤大佐及遠藤中佐ニ於テ決定セリ然レ討伐隊ヲ直
接指揮セルモノ次ノ如シ

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滿洲獲得ニ從ヒ日本ハ滿洲ヲ組織ニ着手セリニツキ、意
見アリ、カニ滿洲ヲ支那ノ政權ノ下ニ置キ、滿洲政權ニ若
干日本顧問ヲハルル要ス、然レニ關東軍司令官ニ勤務スル
石原中佐板垣大佐、主張ニヨリ、荒木大將父之ヲ支持シ、帝
政滿洲獨立ヲ樹立シ、其實權ヲ日本ニ於テ把握スル様
組織セリ、之ヲ爲メ各大臣ヲ滿人トシ、次長ハ日人ヲ任命シ、
官衙内ニ日人官吏ヲハルルコトヲ決定セリ、斯カル政策ハ又
一層ニ滿人中ニ抗日運動ノ氣分ヲ鋭クセリ、是ハ滿洲ニ於
テ日本軍ニ對シ、抗日ニ活動シ、ナル反抗軍ノ振大ノ原因ニ
爲セリ、關東軍ハ是ニ對シ、滿洲ニ於ケル抗日分子ヲ討
伐ニヨリ掃蕩シ、他方ニ於テ宣傳ニヨリ服従ニ導順ヲ勤
ムコトヲカキ、任務トセリ、是等ノ主ナル討伐ハ哈爾濱錦州
東遼道附近ニ行ハル、又馬占山及李杜軍ノ追撃ヲ討伐
等ナリ、是等ノ討伐ハ關東軍司令官本庄大將武蔵大將
、時參謀長三宅中將、小磯中將ニヨリ行ハル、是等ノ
討伐作戰ハ無事、滿人住民ニ大ナル損害破産ヲ與ヘタリ、
即チ討伐ハ住民ノ離散住家ノ燒却財産ノ喪失等ヲ伴フ
コトヲ明ラカニ認メサルカラス、私ハ長年月ヲ経過セル爲
討伐ニヨリ住民ニ與ヘタル犠牲ノ數量ト範圍ヲ記憶セリ、
然レ七年前ノ關東軍ニヨリ大ナル犠牲ヲ與ヘタルコトヲ認メサ
ルカラス、私ハカニ課長トシ、關東軍司令官ニ在職
間、是等討伐ノ數量及計劃ハ關東軍司令部ニ於テ
有藤大佐及遠藤中佐ニ於テ決定セリ、然レ討伐隊ヲ直
接指揮セルモノ、次ノ如シ、

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- 一、哈爾濱及吉林附近 第十師團(長廣瀨中將)
- 二、錦州附近及熱河 第八師團(長西中將)
- 三、黑龍江省及哈爾濱附近 第七師團(長松本中將後堀俊中將)
- 四、熱河附近 第六師團(長坂本中將)
混成旅團(長服部少將)

上記師團の内二部、他方面ニ於テ同時ニ討伐ヲ行リ

熱河討伐、關東軍司令官武藤大將カ直接指揮セリ。
私ニ熱河討伐ニ参加ス。抗日軍、行動動靜及抗日氣
勢、發生ニタル住民、區域等ニ關シテ諜報資料ヲ私ニ
課長トシテ關東軍參謀長ニ提出シ、是ニ基キ關東軍
司令部第一課ハ討伐ニ對シテ計劃ヲ策定セリ。一九三四
年春佳木斯南方土龍山附近ニ於テ大ナル討伐、廢棄ヲ行
ヒタリ。是ハ日本、滿洲拓殖會社カ滿人、土地ヲ買収シ
タルニ對シテ附近、滿洲部隊カ反抗暴動ヲ起シ、中隊ヲ
殲滅シ又聯隊長飯塚大佐ヲ殺シタルヲ以テ是ヲ討伐
ニタルモノナリ。土龍山附近、暴動ヲ鎮壓スル爲メ日本軍
大ナル部隊ヲ派遣シ、自己、聯隊長飯塚大佐ヲ殺ス
ヨリ復仇ノ意思ヲ加ヘリ。滿人住民ニ大ナル損害ヲ與
タリ。此作戰ハ第十師團(長廣瀨中將)參謀長加納大
佐ヨリ實施セラレ、一九三二年ヨリ一九三六年迄滿洲ニ於
テ關東軍ニヨリ行ハタル全數ノ討伐ノ責任ハ此期間
ニ於テ關東軍司令官タル本庄大將、武藤大將、及
大將、關東軍大將ニ在リ。

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同時一九三三年三月日本、東支鐵道、經營、三、二、三、蘇
聯、勢力ヲ滿洲ヨリ、驅逐セ、多量重ヲ開始セ、此日
約、以テ東支鐵道及其職員ニ付、三、二、三、各種、壓迫ヲ加
ス、是等、工作、主ト三、二、三、滿洲實業特務機關長、小松原少
將、及滿洲實業鐵道、後、支、延、美、理、事、及、其、他、機、關、ニ、ヨリ
行ハレタリ、此、工作、(閣、事、軍、司、令、部、才、二、課、長、原、田、大、佐、
、指、導、下、二、行、一、リ、) 滿洲ニ於テ、二、蘇、聯、勢、力、ヲ、驅、逐、
セ、爲、二、日、本、八、東、支、鐵、道、三、獲、取、者、ヲ、使、用、シ、タ、ル、二、鐵、
道、經營、三、村、之、妨、害、並、二、鐵、道、職、員、三、村、之、壓、迫、ヲ、行、ヒ、爲、
二、日、本、八、滿、洲、ヲ、利、用、シ、タ、ル、二、國、三、利、益、ヲ、認、メ、ル、二、能、ク、
三、其、時、情、況、八、東、支、鐵、道、三、二、三、及、金、滿、鐵、道、ノ、經、營、八、滿、
洲、三、妨、害、セ、ル、二、ヤ、リ、
一九三五年日本、八、凡、工、ル、手、段、ヲ、
盡、シ、テ、蘇、聯、ヲ、三、東、支、鐵、道、ノ、權、益、ヲ、喪、却、ス、ル、二、至、ラ、シ、メ、タ、リ、
其、後、日、本、八、滿、洲、ニ、於、テ、對、蘇、作、戰、爲、軍、事、地、盤、準、備、ヲ、
配、力、振、大、セ、リ、滿、洲、ノ、地、盤、準、備、ニ、ツ、テ、日、本、八、地、區、三、重、
要、ヲ、構、築、三、大、小、三、百、ノ、飛、行、場、ヲ、設、置、シ、九、千、百、米、ノ、鐵、道、ヲ、
敷、設、シ、路、線、津、浦、三、梁、港、區、信、道、路、ノ、構、築、軍、需、工、場、ノ、設、
置、其、他、ヲ、建、設、セ、リ、是、等、ノ、建、設、ノ、大、致、八、日、本、政、府、參、謀、
本、部、陸、軍、省、務、局、ノ、計、画、ニ、基、キ、實、施、セ、リ、是、等、ノ、計、画、及、
參、謀、本、部、ノ、指、示、ニ、基、キ、自、己、ノ、要、求、セ、ル、事、ヲ、遂、行、ス、ル、
爲、三、國、東、軍、八、次、ノ、如、ク、セ、リ、

1. 要塞構築、爲、梁、城、部
2. 飛行場構築、爲、飛、行、部、隊
3. 作戰道路建設、爲、滿、洲、工、木、工、程、局

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同時一九三三年三月日本（東支鐵道）經營、三下五蘇
聯、勢力ヲ滿洲ヨリ驅逐セ、重要道路ヲ開始セリ、此日
約、以テ東支鐵道及其職員ニ對シテ各種ノ壓迫ヲ加ヘ
タリ、是等ノ工作ハ主トシテ滿洲省特務機關長、少松、少
將、及滿洲省滿鉄代表、宇佐美、理事及其他、機關ニヨリ
行ハレタリ、此工作ハ關東軍司令部第二課長、原田、大佐
ノ指導、下ニ行ハレリ、滿洲ニ於ケル蘇聯勢力ヲ驅逐
スル爲メ、日本（東支鐵道）三機關ヲ使用シタリ、鐵
道、經營ニ對シテ妨害並ニ鐵道職員ニ對シテ壓迫ヲ行ヒ、且
日本（滿鉄）利用シタリ、三國ノ私ハ否認スルコト能ハズ、然
レモ當時、情勢ハ東支鐵道、ニシテ全滿、鐵道、經營ハ滿
鉄ニ、妨害セラルベシ、一九三五年日本ハ凡ソ此手段ヲ
盡シテ蘇聯ヲ東支鐵道、權益ヲ喪却スルニ至ラシメタリ、
其後日本ハ滿洲ニ於テ對蘇作戰、爲軍用地盤整備ヲ
亟ク欲セリ、滿洲ノ地盤整備ニシテ日本ハ地底ニ要
塞ヲ構築スルニ大ニ意ヲ行フ、飛行場ヲ設置スルニ九千五百米、鐵道ヲ
敷設スルニ蘇聯境、及蘇境、蓋信、道路、構築、軍需工場、設
置、其他ヲ建設セリ、是等ノ建設、大抵ハ日本政府參謀
本部、陸軍省、事務局、計劃ニ基キ實施セリ、是等ノ計劃、及
參謀本部、指示ニ基キ自己ノ要求セシモノヲ遂行スル
爲メ、關東軍ハ次、如クセリ、

1. 要塞構築、爲軍需城部
2. 飛行場構築、爲飛行部隊
3. 作戰道路建設、爲滿洲土木工程局

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4. 通信施設、為滿洲鐵道會社
5. 築港及鐵道、建設、滿鐵之本
6. 煙草工場、設置及經營、為滿洲煙草工業株式會社、設置又

日本當局、是年、滿洲及日本移民為強制的、僱傭、以
滿人、土地、買收、又彼等、別地、移住、之、滿人、大、不、滿、
招、多、此、外、軍、事、構、築、作、業、為、活、働、カ、ト、強、制、制、度、
滿人、徵、傭、此、活、働、者、徵、用、自、由、活、働、比、之、低、率、
賃、金、之、差、ハ、滿人、福、祉、之、苦、痛、與、之、他、方、面、於、
住、宅、設、及、衛、生、給、養、狀、況、及、日、本、官、理、之、不、良、等、
活、働、者、中、多、數、病、死、有、之、出、之、例、ハ、一、九、四、四、年、興、安、鎮、
附、近、之、軍、庫、構、築、中、滿人、活、働、者、約、二、萬、人、
死、亡、率、五、百、名、達、也、他、方、面、於、死、亡、者、有、リ、
總、參、謀、長、系、中、將、及、後、方、官、大、將、自、合、談、明、
リ、一、九、四、五、年、於、之、因、東、軍、強、制、徵、用、滿人、活、働、者、
一、三、萬、名、達、也、

一、九、三、一、年、滿、洲、事、變、以、來、全、期、間、五、年、滿、洲、社、會、軍、事、
基、地、強、化、之、為、行、之、多、ル、處、置、責、任、者、日、本、內、閣、大、臣、
近、衛、東、條、大、將、日、本、陸、軍、大、臣、荒、木、大、將、杉、山、大、將、東、條、大、
將、參、謀、總、長、金、谷、大、將、閑、院、官、杉、山、大、將、東、條、大、將、
東、軍、司、令、官、本、庄、大、將、菱、刈、大、將、南、大、將、植、田、大、將、梅、津、大、
將、其、他、本、証、言、記、述、也、因、東、軍、司、令、部、勤、務、者、
私、一、九、三、四、年、八、月、參、謀、本、部、及、那、參、謀、長、ト、之、轉、任、
總、長、閑、院、官、大、將、杉、山、中、將、後、大、將、第、一、部、長、金、谷、
將、後、中、將、第、二、部、長、磯、谷、大、將、後、中、將、第、三、部、長、後、

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4. 通信施設、爲滿洲電氣會社
5. 築港及鉄道、建設、滿鉄、本、
6. 庫庫工場、設置及経営爲滿洲重工業株式會社、設置云

日本當局、是年滿洲及日本移民爲強制的、賃金、以、
滿人、土地、買収、又、彼等、別地、移住セ、滿人、大ナル、不満ヲ
招キ、此、外、庫庫工場、工業、爲、労働、カ、ト、強制、制度、作
リ、滿人、徴用セリ、此、労働、爲、徴用、自由、労働、比、低、率、ナル、
賃金、受ル、以、滿人、福祉、甚、痛、與、ヘリ、他、方面、於、以、
住、施設、及、衛生、給、養、状況、及、日本、官、理、ノ、不、良、等、ヨリ、労働、
者、中、多、數、病、死、者、出、タリ、例、ヘ、一、九、四、四、年、興、安、鎮、
附近、零、度、街、村、ニ、ヨリ、滿人、労働、者、約、二、萬、人、作、業、セ、ル、カ、
死亡、率、五、百、名、達、セリ、他、方面、於、以、死、亡、者、有、リ、前、關、東、軍、
總、參、謀、長、系、中、將、及、後、宮、大、將、自、合、説明、セリ、量、之、ハ、サ
リ、一、九、四、五、年、於、以、關、東、軍、強制、徴用、滿人、労働、者、一、三、万、
一、三、万、に、達、セリ、

一、九、三、一、年、滿、洲、華、僑、采、金、期、間、五、リ、滿、洲、社、隊、軍、事、
基地、強化、爲、行、ハ、タ、ル、處、置、責、任、者、日、本、内、閣、大、臣、
近、衛、東、條、大、將、日、本、陸、軍、大、臣、荒、木、大、將、杉、山、大、將、東、條、大、
將、參、謀、總、長、金、谷、大、將、閑、院、宮、大、將、東、條、大、將、南、
軍、軍、令、官、本、庄、大、將、菱、刈、大、將、南、大、將、植、田、大、將、梅、津、大、
將、其、他、本、証、言、記、述、セ、ル、關、東、軍、司、令、部、勤、務、者、
私、一、九、三、四、年、八、月、參、謀、本、部、及、那、參、謀、長、ト、シ、轉、任、ス、當時、
總、長、閑、院、宮、大、將、杉、山、中、將、後、大、將、(第一、部、長、鈴木、
將、後、中、將、第二、部、長、磯、谷、大、將、後、中、將、(第三、部、長、後、

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又支那内政ニ干渉スルニ至ラニタリ

支那大使館附武官時代、私、一九三六年四月支那大使館附武官ニ任命セテ上海ニ着任セリ。是ヨリ先東京^敵ニ於テ、日支關係悪化ニアルニ鑑ミ、外務省ハ新タニ川越大使ヲ支那ニ任命セリ。川越大使ノ解決スベキ問題ノ内容ハ次ノ如シ

1. 支那、滿洲ニ於ケル日本權利ヲ默認スニ即チ支那、

日本、滿洲ヲ獲得ミタリコトヲ見テ振リヲス

2. 支那、抗日毎日ヲ禁制スヘシ。日支兩國、經濟提携合作ニ進ム

3. 支那、日本ニ防共ニ協力ス

以上ニ條件ハ、代償トシテ日本、支那ニ經濟的技術的援助ヲナスニアリト記憶ス而シテ一九三六年六月川越大使、此問題ニツキ南京政府ト交渉ヲ開始シタルニ南京政府、同意セサリコトヲ以テ交渉停止トナシ、南京政府、日本、提出條件ニ對シ次ノ如ク答ヘタリ

1. 支那ハ公決ト滿洲國ヲ認メザルニ滿洲ニ於ケル現狀ニシテ默認ス

2. 支那自体ハ共產思想ニ對シ反抗ス具體的ニ云ヘシ第八路軍ニ對シ反抗シアルニ此方面ニ於テ對蘇外交上關係惡化スルニ恐レルヲ以テ日本ト防共協力ヲ約束スルニトハ出来ス

3. 支那政府ハ支那ニ於ケル抗日運動ヲ自己、カヲ以テ禁制スル能ハス是レ個人ノ氣分ニアラス

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主支那國民全體、感情を以てナリ

南京政府、大義を以て最後迄持てしむる以て一九三七年日本對支戰開始、タメ根源ナリナリ和、上海大使館時武官トテ出発前參謀次長西尾中將、訓令ヲ受テタリ、其内容、重要ナル如シ、南京政府對支協約、軍事状況ニ關スル情報ヲ蒐集スルト共ニ川越大使、兩國國交調整ニ關シ協力スベシ

私、時々南京ニ赴キ川越大使ニ會見セリ

然レテ主支那關係情勢、漸次險惡トナリ一九三七年六月北京郊外於テ日本駐屯部隊、演習ヲ行ヒタル際支那人、之ヲ突カセリタリ事象發生セリ

日本現地ニ於テ解決スルヲ努力シタルニ成功スルニ至ラス後日本、蔣介石政權ヲ否認シ支那軍ヲ廢絶スルヲ進取スルコトヲ新聞及外交代表者ニ発表セリ一九三七年八月上海附近ニ於テ日本陸戰隊(運軍)ト支那軍ト衝突ス是レ日支戰遂次擴大セル次、段階ナリ

特務部長及興亞院連絡部長實戰、一九三七年八月日支戰事擴大、際共支方面軍ニ北京ニ設置セラル、三件ニ私、方面軍、特務部長ニ任命ス北京ニ著任ス私、陸軍大臣杉山大將ニ任命スナリ、特務部、軍政業務ヲ實施、直接任務、支那兵領袖ヲ日本兵ニ任シ、即チ監督

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經濟文化及政治、指導機關タル政權ヲ樹立ス

私、特務部、組織ニ次、局ヲ設ケタリ

1. 總務局 政治問題ニ関係ス

2. 第一經濟局 金融經濟ニ関係ス

3. 第二經濟局 交通產業ニ関係ス

4. 文化局 教育文化ニ関係ス

當時支那、主領地ニ於ケル政治經濟、總管計畫策定、毎日
本政府各省ヨリ特務部ニ專門家ヲ派遣セリ、私、特務部長ノ
時北支ニ於ケル重要ナル位置、北支ニ親日家王克敏ヲ首班ト
スル政權ヲ樹立シタルコトナリ、彼ハ從來財政大臣、經歷ヲ
有セルモノ、政權時代ナリシヤ私、記憶セズ王克敏政權
ニ於ケル顧問トシテ日本代表ヲ入ル、此顧問、政治問題ニツキ
自今カ直接担当セリ、經濟顧問平生鈺三郎、行政顧問
湯澤三才、司法政顧問大島茂雄ニシテ後者三名、軍人ニシ
ス顧問、原則ハ王克敏政府、行動及行動ニ於ケル日本政府
政策ヲ実行シ又全カヲ盡シテ支那戰ニ於ケル日本軍ニ協力ス
ルニ事、特務部ハ解散シ特務部、職務ハ新タニ組織シタル
興亞院ニ移リ又興亞院、北支連絡部長官ニ私ヲ任命セリ、
私、此任命ヲ内閣ヨリ受ケタリ當時、總理ハ平沼ナリ興亞

軍、機關ニ非ザルニヨリ私、文官ニ移リタルモ現役ニ列スルコト

ナリ又興亞院委員ナリ興亞院、中央設、東京ニ在リ
平沼總理、院長、頭首ニシテ興亞院總裁ナリ副總裁、陸軍
大臣板垣中將、海軍大臣外務大臣大藏大臣、興亞院委
員、約六十名ナリ實際、仕事、總裁之ヲ行ハズ興亞院、
総務長官柳川平助之ヲ實施ス此興亞院、社會機關ニ

非ラス純國家機關タルニヨリ文官及軍人ニ於テモ委員トナルコトヲ得、上述ノ如ク興亞院ノ計畫的任務ハ自今カ一九四〇年迄連絡部長官タリシ間ハ支那ヲ日本化スルニ在リ私ハ大東亞ノ組織ニ入ル他國ニ此計畫ハ及バザルコトヲヨク承知ス。

然レ後ニ日米戦争開始ノ時日本ハ東亞ニ於テ他方ヲ占領シタル時例ヘハビルマ、泰、佛印、及島其他南洋ノ島ヲ占領シタル時興亞院ノ如キ活動ノ範圍ハ大ニ拡大セルヲ以テ支那ノミナス大東亞ニ於テ占領地区ニ興亞院ノ計畫的任務ヲ遂行スル爲ニ興亞院ニ基キ最モ大ニ強化セル組織ヲ要求スルニ至レリ。斯クシテ一九四二年当初興亞院ハ新設大東亞省ニ編入セリ又興亞院ノ連絡部長官ノ勤務ハ各占領地ニ於テ設置セラレタル大使館ニ移管セリ例ハ滿洲ニ於テ爾特命全權大使岡東軍司令官山田大將支那ニ於テ汪精衛政權ニ對シテ同様ナレ大使官又ビルマ、泰、佛印及日本ノ占領シタル他方ニ於テ斯カ大使館アリキ。是等大使館ハ元ノ興亞院ノ計畫的任務ヲ遂行セラレタリ即チ日本ニ於テ占領シタル領土ヲ日本化セリ。私ハ此ニ於テ特務部長及連絡部長官時代ニ在リテハ北支軍ノ作戰行動ノ適當ナル狀態ヲ確保セシムル爲並ニ滿洲軍事地盤強化援助ノ爲大ナル仕事ヲ行ヘリ。

一九三七年夏北支方面軍ノ行動ニ伴ヒ張家口ニ於テ内蒙駐屯軍ヲ設置セラル一九三七年八月内蒙東軍ハ參謀長東條中將(後大將)指揮ノ下ニ内蒙ヲ占領シ茲ニ於テ特務機關ヲ設置シ松井少將ヲ任命シタリ後駐蒙軍設置(司令官蓮沼中將)ノ除ハ特務機關ハ特務部ニ更生シ松井少將ハ其儘長トナレリ、一九三七年十一月頃松井少

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將ハ徳王ヲ首班トスル日本の蒙疆政府ヲ樹立セリ此政府
ニ滿洲ヨリ来タル日人顧問ヲハタシ内蒙ノ占領及日本
的政府樹立目的ハ滿洲ヲ獲得セル時ト同様目的ヲ追
ヒ即チ内蒙ヲ日本ニ掌握ニ此領土ニ於テ對外蒙軍事基地
ヲ作ストスルニ在リ是ノ處置ハ當時關東軍參謀長東
條中將、主張ニヨリ行ハタリ東條中將ハ日本總理大臣
トナレルモ此方針ヲ継続セリ内蒙ヲ獲得スル爲ニ行ハタ
ル處置ニ於テ自分ノ援助ハ北支ニ於テ北支方面軍及那軍之支那
及内蒙ヨリ驅逐スル爲メ條件ヲ作り以テ東條中將ノ蒙古占領
ヲ容易ナラシムルニ現レタリ日本ハ内蒙ニ於テル資産ハ不足爲
滿洲ニ於テルカ如ク要塞構築ヲ處置セザリ三元一四二四年迄内
蒙五方ノ兵カラ有セリ 一九三八年張敬奎一九三九年「モ」
ハニモ境紛争問題ニ関シハ日本軍ノ不法行動ニヨリ日蘇兩
軍間戰トナレルモノニテ其事件ノ經過及責任者ニツキ詳細
承知セラシアルヲ以テ私ハ茲ニ何モ新クニ答辯ヲ有セズ
一九四〇年三月私ハ興亞院ノ連絡部長官ヨリ召還セラレ
宇都宮(日本)ニアルオ十四師團長ニ任セラレタリ私ハ
一九四〇年九月參謀總長閑院宮ヨリ計畫ニ基キ關東軍
ハ十五師團迄増加スヘキヲ以テオ十四師團ハ滿洲ニ轉用
セラルヘキ旨内示ヲ受ケタリ

私ハ一九四〇年十月師團ト共ニ齊々哈爾濱ニ到着ス
關東軍、此増加ハ滿内秩序ヲ防衛スル爲メ斯カル數量
ノ兵カラ要セサルヲ以テ日本、對蘇作戰準備ナリ

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私一九四〇年師團上共三齊各略爾居是時自分、判斷
 以外ニ才六軍司令官ヨリ才十四師團ハ用戰、場合
 バイラル、平地ニ使用スヘキヲ以テ師團、將校ハ海社爾附近
 ノ地形ニ精通スルヲ要ス又教育ハ裝備優良ナル蘇軍ニ
 對スル持久防禦ニ重點ヲ置キ訓練スヘキ旨、秘定訓令ヲ
 受ケタリ。尚、バイラル、才六軍司令部ニ於テ、一九四〇年二團
 ニ亘リ、バイラル、附近ノ圖上戰術演習ヲ實施シ對蘇作戰ヲ研究
 セリ。私及師團、參謀ハ是ニ參加セリ。私ハ對蘇戰闘ニ
 重點ヲ置キ部下ヲ訓練セリ。
 一九四二年獨蘇戰後參謀本部ハ對蘇作戰準備強化
 ノ爲日本ヨリ人馬及砲ヲ送り關東軍ニ大ナル増強ヲ行ヒタリ
 此増加ハ關特演ノ稱呼アル計畫ニ基キ實施セリ。
 一九四二年夏此計畫ニ基キ關東軍、兵數及兵器ハ最高迄
 達セリ。才一從來十三師團アリシヲ日本ヨリ新、タニ二師團ヲ送り
 此外各師團ハ人員五〇〇〇、馬三五〇〇ヲ増加セルヲ以テ關東軍ハ
 關特演前ニ

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十三師團	人	一九五〇〇〇	
戰車三師團	人	三〇、〇〇〇	戰車、四〇〇

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飛行軍 人 二四、〇〇〇 飛行機 一、〇〇〇

國境守備隊（三八大隊）人 一九、六〇〇

鐵道守備隊（五 隊）人 一七、五〇〇

後方部隊 人 一〇〇、〇〇〇

計 人 三八六、〇〇〇

馬 四〇、〇〇〇

ナリシ力固特演、計畫ニヨリ行ハタル増加後國東軍ハ
人六〇〇、〇〇〇 馬八〇、〇〇〇ヲ有スルニ至リ。

砲ニ關シハ私ノ指揮シアリシオ十四師團ニ於テ固特演計畫
ニ基キ行ハタル増加前三十六門増加後四十八門ナリ。

他ノ師團モ同様ニ増加シタルコトヲ考慮シ得ヘシ。

國東軍増加ノ際大本營ヨリ對蘇作戰準備ヲ促進スヘキ
命令ヲ發セリ此命令ハ一九四一年六月下旬ニ發セラレタルモ

私ハ之ヲ讀ミアラス國東軍ノ勤務者ヨリ聞キタルノミナリ

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以テ番号ヲ知ラス此時私ハオ十四師團ノ属スルオ六軍司令官
ヨリ教養訓練ヲ促進スヘキ訓令以外ニ別ニ命令ヲ受ケアラス

然シオ六軍司令官ハ海拉爾ニ在リオ二十三師團ヲ指揮シ

速カニ作戰準備ヲ行フ為メ海拉爾東方高地野戰築城

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飛行軍 人 二四、〇〇〇 飛行機 一〇〇〇

国境守備隊(三八大隊) 人 一九、六〇〇

鉄道守備隊(五 隊) 人 一七、五〇〇

後方部隊 人 一〇〇、〇〇〇

計 人 三八六、〇〇〇

馬 四〇、〇〇〇

ナリシカ周特演、計画三ヨリ行ハタル増加後周東軍ハ

人六〇〇、〇〇〇 馬八〇、〇〇〇ヲ有スルニ至リ

砲ニ関シハ私ノ指揮シアリシ才十四師團ニ於テ周特演計画

ニ基キ行ハタル増加前三十六門増加後四十八門ナリ

他ノ師團モ同様ニ増加シタルコトヲ考慮シ得ヘシ

周東軍増加ノ際大本営ヨリ對蘇作戰準備ヲ促進スヘキ

命令ヲ發セリ此命令ハ一九四一年六月下旬ニ發セラレタルモ

私ハ之ヲ讀ミアラヌ周東軍ノ勤務者ヨリ聞キタルノミナリ

以テ番号ヲ知ラス此時私ハ才十四師團ノ屋スル才六軍司令官

ヨリ教育訓練ヲ促進スヘキ訓令以外ニ別ニ命令ヲ受ララス

然シ才六軍司令官ハ海拉爾ニ在リ才二十三師團ヲ指揮シ

速カニ作戰準備ヲ行フ為メ海拉爾東方高地ニ戰築城

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飛行軍 人 二四、〇〇〇 飛行機 一〇〇〇

国境守備隊(三八大隊) 人 一九、六〇〇

鉄道守備隊(五 隊) 人 一七、五〇〇

後方部隊 人 一〇〇、〇〇〇

計 人 三八六、〇〇〇

馬 四〇、〇〇〇

ナリシカ國特演、計畫ヨリ行ハタル増加後周東軍ハ
人六〇、〇〇〇 馬八〇、〇〇〇ヲ有スルニ至リ

砲二團シテハ私ノ指揮シアリシオ十四師團ニ於テ國特演計畫
ニ基キ行ハタル増加前三十六門増加後四十八門ナリ

他、師團モ同様ニ増加シタルコトヲ考慮シ得ヘシ

周東軍増加ノ際大本營ヨリ對蘇作戰準備ヲ促進スヘキ
命令ヲ發セリ此命令ハ一九四一年六月下旬ニ發セラレタルモ

私ハ之ヲ讀ミアラス周東軍ノ勤務者ヨリ聞キタルノミナリ

16 以テ番号ヲ知ラス此時私ハオ十四師團ノ屋スルオ六軍司令官
ヨリ教育訓練ヲ促進スヘキ訓令以外ニ別ニ命令ヲ受テアラス

然シオ六軍司令官ハ海拉爾ニ在ルオ二十三師團ヲ指揮シ

速カニ作戰準備ヲ行フ為メ海拉爾東方高地野戰築城

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ヲ構築セリ。一九四二年夏ノ凡テノ状態ハ関東軍ニ於テハ對蘇
開戦準備促進ノ性質ヲ有セリ。

然シ此時日本軍ハ佛印ヲ侵領セルニヨリ日本關係ハ急激ニ
尖鋭シ情況ハ緊迫シ日本ラシテ二途、岐路ニ立タシメタリ
日本政府ハ所謂對蘇及對米開戦ヲ何レヲ先キニ行フ
ヘキカラ知ラザリキ

一九四二年六月東京御前會議ニ於テ次ノ三條ヲ決定セラル
一、對蘇戰ニハ独自ノ意見及政策ヲ以テ進ム。

二、對南方作戰準備ヲ進ム

三、蘇聯ニ對シ國境靜謐ヲ守ル。

然シ此時ニ於テ元閣特演計畫ニ基キ日本ヨリ関東軍ニ兵力
増加ヲ繼續セラレタルヲ以テ日本ハ蘇聯ヲ急激ニ刺戟セリ

一九四二年十月私ハ才六軍司令官ニ任命セラレタリ固モ無ク

他、兵團長ト共ニ関東軍司令部ニ呼ハレタリ實際関東

軍司令官梅澤大將ハ各軍司令官ニ戰時軍ノ任務關シ

別々ニ訓示ヲ與ヘタリ。私ハ才六軍ノ為次ノ如ク訓令ヲ受

ケタリ才六軍ハ開戦、場合海拉爾陣地及附近ノ要地ヲ

確保シテ持久ヲ策ス一箇月後才六軍ニ師團ヲ増加ス

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然シ持久防禦ノ時間及開戦ノ時期ニ関シテ梅津大將ハ
私ニ指示セサリキ、只海拉爾陣地ヲ長期間保持スルニ在リ
私ハ與ヘラレタル任務ニ基キ、ハイラル、東方高地ニ從來第三三
師團ヲ構築シタル陣地ヲ補強シ作戰準備ヲ強化セリト今時
ニ彈藥糧秣等半年ヲ目途トシテ海拉爾附近ニ貯藏セリ
而シテ一九四三年六月齊々哈爾ニ於テオ六軍、隸屬スルオ二方面
軍設置、陸軍司令官阿南惟幾中將ヨリオ二方面軍設置
ノ目的及最近ノ任務又自分ノ指揮スルオ六軍ノ最近及將來
ノ任務ニツキ説明ヲ受ケタリ此説明ヨリ私ハ關東軍カ參謀
本部ニ於テ決定シタル作戰計畫乙号秘密名稱ニ基キ行ヒアル
對蘇攻勢ノ準備ニ関シ承知セリ、關特演ノ計畫ヨリ日本及
支那ヨリ關東軍、爲人馬及砲彈藥ヲ増加セラル此關特
演ハ乙号ノ名稱アル一般作戰計畫、一部ノ準備ナリ、茲ニ又
阿南中將ハ私ニ作戰中三段階ニ於テオ六軍ハ攻勢作戰ヲ取
ルヲ以テ是カ研究及準備ヲナスヘキ旨指示セリ、又オ二段階
ニ於テオ二方面軍主力ノ作戰計畫ニツキ説明セリ其詳細ハ後
ニ説明ス。

オ一段階ニ於テ乙号作戰計畫ニ基キ沿海州地ニ攻勢ハ

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才一才方面軍ニ於テ行フ才一才方面軍ノ攻勢作戰計畫ハ私ハ
一九四四年十月東京ニ於テ前才一才方面軍司令官山下大將ヨリ
業務引継ノ際承知セリ又其他此作戰ニキ才一才方面軍司令官
トシテ牡丹江ニ着任ノ際軍參謀長田手井中將ハ細密ニ説明
セリ、之ヲ以テ私ハ乙号ノ計畫ニヨル肉東軍ノ才一才二方面
軍ノ準備及攻勢作戰ノ經過ニ通曉セリ此ノ計畫ヲ以テ
次ノ処置ヲ取ラレタリ

準備處置

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黒河方面 此方面ニ於テ平時才四軍二師團及一國境守備
隊アリ軍司令部ハ孫吳ニ位置ス對蘇國戰前齊々哈爾ニ
才二才方面軍 黒河ニN軍(後ニ才八軍トルカ如シ)ヲ設置ス
是等ノ編合ハ支那及日本ヨリ四師團ヲ轉用シテ行フ從ツテ
開戦前ニ才二才方面軍ノ兵力ハ六師團ニ達ス其中孫吳ノ
才四軍三師團 黒河ノ才八軍二師團方面軍直轄一師團ナリ
其他才二才方面軍ニ属スル才六軍ハ才三三師團及阿爾山部隊
(約一師團)開戦後一師團ヲ増加スヘク將來又二師團ヲ増加ス
沿海州方面 平時ニ此方面ニ駐在シタルハ才五軍三師團
才三軍三師團 琿春才七一師團、佳木斯肉東軍直轄

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一師團計八師團ト戰車二師團ナリ

一九四二年鶴岡ニオ二軍司令部ヲ設置シオ二軍一八
オ三オ五軍ヨリ各ニ一師團ヲ抽出シテ與ヘラレタリ。南戰前
ニ乙号計畫ニヨリ牡丹江ニオ一方面軍司令部、周島ニオ二軍
司令部ヲ設置ス又日本及支那ヨリ此方面ニ新タニ八師團ヲ
轉用ス是ニヨリオ一方面軍八十五師團及戰車二師團ナル。
内オ五軍三師團、戰車一師團、オ三軍五師團ト戰車一師團
オ三軍三師團、オ二軍二師團、オ一六軍直轄三師團ナリ。
此外関東軍司令官直轄飛行一軍飛行機一千機アリ
関東軍ハ乙号計畫ニヨリ南戰直前ニ東正面北正面西正面
共ニ斯ル状態トル

攻勢計畫、乙号攻勢ノ計畫ニヨリ全極東バウカルニ至ル迄
獲得ヲ豫期ス。此攻勢計畫ハ四段階ニ別ツ

オ一段階ニ於テオ二方面軍、オ四軍及N軍ハ孫吳及黑河

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附近蘇聯國境ニ於テ示威的行動ヲ行ヒ時々蘇領ヲ射
撃シ以テ攻勢準備ヲ粧フ。然レトモ攻勢ヲ取ラス斯クシテ
專ラ此方面ニ赤軍ヲ拘束シ若シ赤軍變^機シ来ラハ抑制スオ六
軍ハ海拉爾及阿爾山ノ陣地ヲ確保ス若シ赤軍ニシテ知多方面

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ヨリ滿州里ヲ經テ攻敵軍シ末ル場合ニハ此等陣地ヲ固守シテ之ヲ阻止ス此際沿海州方面第一方面軍ハ次ノ計畫ヨリ斷平トテ攻勢ヲ取ル

α. オ五軍ハ三師團戰車一師團ヲ以テ虎林ヨリ前進シイモシヲ占領シ一部ヲ以テ北方ニ對シ同地ヲ確保シ主力ハ南進ヲ行フ附近第一方面軍主力ノ會戰ニ參加ス

β. オ三軍ハ二師團ヲ以テ瑯春ヨリ前進國境ヲ突破シ南島地区ヲ北進ヲ行フニ向フ其行動ハ方面軍主力ト策應ス

γ. オ二軍ハ五師團戰車一師團ヲ以テ東安ヨリ南方ニ向ヒ興寧湖西南側ヲ經テ「オロシロフ」ニ向ヒ前進ス

δ. オ三軍ハ三師團ヲ以テ東安ヨリ「プロデコフ」ニ向ヒ前進ス茲ニ於テ方面軍主力ニ參加ス

是等ノ總テノ兵力ハ「オロシロフ」ニ於テ赤軍ヲ制壓シ「オロシロフ」

21

ヲ占領後一部ヲ以テ元山ニ在ル日本海軍ト策應シテ浦塩ヲ

攻圍占領ス是ヲ以テオ一段階ヲ終了ス主ナル目的ハ蘇聯

沿海州全域ヲ占領シ日本自体及滿洲産業地区ヲ沿海州

方面ヨリスル赤軍ノ航空襲撃數ヲニ對シ安全トラシムルニ在リ

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ヨリ滿州里ヲ經テ攻戰シタル場合ニハ此等陣地ヲ固守シテ之ヲ阻止ス此際沿海州方面第一方面軍ハ次ノ計畫ヨリ斷平トシテ攻勢ヲ取ル

a. オ五軍ハ三師團戰車一師團ヲ以テ虎林ヨリ前進シテ之ヲ占領シ一部ヲ以テ北方ニ對シ同地ヲ確保シ主力ハ南進スルヲ附近第一方面軍主力ノ會戰ニ參加ス

b. オ三軍ハ三師團ヲ以テ瑯春ヨリ前進國境ヲ突破シ南島地ニテ北進スルヲ以テ其行動ハ方面軍主力ト策應ス

c. オ二軍ハ五師團戰車一師團ヲ以テ東安ヨリ南方ニ向ヒ興寧湖西南側ヲ經テ「オロシロフ」ニ向ヒ前進ス

d. オ三軍ハ三師團ヲ以テ東寧縣ヨリ「フロデコフ」ニ向ヒ前進ス茲ニ於テ方面軍主力ニ參加ス

是等ノ總テノ兵力ハ「オロシロフ」ニ於テ赤軍ヲ制壓シ「オロシロフ」

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ヲ占領後一部ヲ以テ元山ニ在ル日本海軍ト策應シテ浦塩ヲ

攻圍占領ス。是ヲ以テオ一段階ヲ終了ス主ナル目的ハ蘇聯

沿海州全域ヲ占領シ日本自体及滿洲産業地ニテ沿海州

方面ヨリスル赤軍ノ航空襲撃ヲニ對シ安全トラシムルニ在リ。

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才ニ段階 才一段階ノ攻勢成功シタル場合ハ占領地区ヲ確保スル
為一部ヲ以テ沿海州ニ残置シ才一方面軍ノ主力ハ北方ニ向ヒ
鉄道ニ沿ヒ「ハバロスク」ニ前進ス。佳木斯ニアリシ師團ハ「レニスク」
ニ対スル陣地ヲ占領シ此附近ニ於テ才一才ニ方面軍ノ翼側ヲ
掩護ス。此時才ニ方面軍ノ才四軍及「軍」ハ才一方面軍ノ
行動ニ策應シテ黑河及其附近ヨリ攻勢ヲ取り「アムール」ヲ渡
河シ「ブラグエ」「クヒグシフカ」「スホルネ」ヲ確保シ西伯利鉄道ヲ
遮斷シ一部ヲ以テ掩護ノ為西方ニ封セシメ主力ハ東方ニ向ヒ
鉄道ニ沿ヒ「ハバロスク」ニ前進ス。茲ニ於テ才一才ニ方面軍ハ
策應シテ赤軍ヲ兩方ヨリ夾撃ヲ決戦シ以テ哈府ヲ占領ス
是ヲ以テ才ニ段階ヲ終ル

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才三段階 哈府占領後才ニ方面軍ハ急速ニ西方ニ轉進シ
將來後貝加爾攻勢作戰ノ為兵力増加準備ヲ行フ
此時海拉爾ニ在ル才六軍ハ三師團ヲ増加セラレ兵力四師
團ニ達シ攻勢前進ノ為準備ヲ行フ
才一方面軍ハ沿海州ニ於テ重要ナル地区及才ニ方面軍ノ後方
ヲ確保ス。

才ニ方面軍ノ主力ハ完全ニ準備シタル後「ソボネヤ」ヨリ西方ニ向ヒ

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西伯利鐵道ニ沿ヒ知多ニ前進ヲ開始ス。才ニ方面軍、主力
モガチヤニ達スレハ才六軍ハ直ニ三河附近及滿洲里附近
國境ヲ突破シ攻勢ヲ開始ス。自己ノ行動ハ才ニ方面軍ノ主力
ニ策應シ知多及其南方地ニ前進ス。
知多及其附近ヲ占領後才ニ方面軍ハ西方ノ重要地ヲ確
保シ才三段階ノ作戰ヲ終ル

才四段階ノ攻勢ニ於テハ後貝加爾及貝加爾ニ至ル迄獲得ス
然シ攻勢計畫、才四段階ニ就テハ私ハ承知ス。

對蒙作戰 才三段階ニ於テ才六軍ノ前進開始ト共ニ阿爾
山部隊(約一師團)ハ才ニ方面軍ノ直轄トナリ滿洲蒙古
部隊(約一師團)ヲ併セ指揮シ阿爾山ヨリ「タムシンボラ」ニ
次テ「バインテン」ウヤンオラサモンヲ經テ知多ニ向ヒ前進ス。
此部隊ハ東部外蒙ヲ前進シツツ才ニ方面軍ノ右翼ヲ
掩護ス。

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大本營ハ總テ、武力ノ行動ニ策應シ北支ヨリ機械化一兵團
ヲ轉用シ張家口ヨリ庫倫ニ向ヒ作戰ノ行動ヲ開始セシム
然シ將來ノ攻勢ノ行動展開ノ計畫ハ私ハ承知セサルヲ以テ
説明スルコト能ハス

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對蘇攻勢計畫、概要以上、如シ此一九四二年度、對蘇
攻勢作戰計畫ハ參謀本部関東軍共ニ立案作製シ
爾後年々更新セリ此日本ノ軍ヲ処置ノ計畫ハ一九四四年
中頃迄存在セリ

日本ハ大東亞戦争ノ戦場ノ困難ナル状態ニ陥リタルニ依リ
此計畫ヲ実行スルコトハ未得ナリキ
此自噴事、證言ハ四名ヲ以テ確認ス

前関東軍第一方面軍司令官大將 喜多 誠一

証同者 デエリエラニキ中佐 署名

通訳者 シチエベンコーフ 署名

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證 明 書

余中佐 G. I. タラネニコ / TARANENKO G. I. 社會主義ソビエト共和國聯邦陸軍、部員ニシテ、茲ニ左記、如ク證明ス

記

日本人俘虜陸軍大將喜多誠ニ依リテ四月二十日ヨリ全二十三日止、間ニ日本語ニテ記サシタル二十三頁ヨリ成ル書證、直接複寫寫真、寫ハ

一九四六年六月二十七日又ハ其後ニ於テ

社會主義ソビエト共和國聯邦ハバロフスク地方、檢察官ヨリ余ニ引渡サシタル。並ニ該文書ノ原本ハハバロフスク地方檢察局、保管書類ノ中ニ所在スルト着ラル。

余ハ要メ左ノ事ヲ證明ス。

(署名及階級) 中佐 タラネニコ / 署名

日本東京ニ於テ

一九四六年九月二十六日